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The authentic judge: French existentialism
and the judicial role
Jonathan Crowe*
This article draws on the writings of the French existentialist philosopher
Jean-Paul Sartre to offer some insights about the judicial role. It begins by
exploring the existentially burdensome character of judging, making
reference to Sartre’s discussions of anguish and the moment of decision.
The article then examines why different judges approach the demands of
their role in contrasting ways, drawing on Sartre’s analysis of various forms
of bad faith [mauvaise foi]. The article concludes by sketching an ideal model
of the authentic judge, based on Sartre’s discussion of authentic love (or
‘love in the world’). The authentic judge accepts responsibility for her
decisions, without disclaiming her authority or denying the contingent nature
of her position. She recognises her inherent fallibility, while nonetheless
saying: ‘this is what I have chosen’.
Judges have a difficult and important job to do on behalf of the community.
Much ink has been spilt on how the judiciary should best approach its role.1
Fortunately, however, we need look no further for guidance on this question
than the writings of the French existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre.
Sartre offers us a compelling explanation of, first, what makes the judicial role
so difficult; second, why different judges approach the demands of the role in
contrasting ways; and, third, how the job should ideally be done. That, at any
rate, is what I propose to argue.
The moment of decision
The first lesson we can draw from Sartre’s writings concerns the existentially
challenging nature of the judge’s role. The judge is regularly called upon to
make choices that can fundamentally affect people’s lives. The stakes are often
high: people may end up in jail or be bankrupted at the judge’s say so. The
judge is the one who is directly responsible for these outcomes. The parties’
actions may have landed them in court, but once they get there their fates are
in the judge’s hands.
* Professor of Law, Bond University. This article was originally presented as a lecture to the
French Australian Lawyers Society at Parliament House, Brisbane on 12 June 2018. I am
grateful to Dan Morgan for inviting me and to all those who participated in the discussion.
The article draws on material previously published in Jonathan Crowe, ‘The Loneliness of
the Referee’ in Ted Richards (ed), Soccer and Philosophy: Beautiful Thoughts on the
Beautiful Game (Open Court, 2010) 347 and Jonathan Crowe, ‘The Authentic Referee’
(2010) 35 Alternative Law Journal 174.
1 Some of it by me. See, eg, Jonathan Crowe, ‘The Role of Contextual Meaning in Judicial
Interpretation’ (2013) 41 Federal Law Review 417; Jonathan Crowe, ‘Functions, Context
and Constitutional Values’ in Rosalind Dixon (ed), Australian Constitutional Values (Hart
Publishing, 2018) 61; Jonathan Crowe, ‘The Narrative Model of Constitutional Implications:
A Defence of Roach v Electoral Commissioner’ (2019) 42 University of New South Wales
Law Journal (forthcoming).
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The judge is free to choose what decision to make. Now, of course, the
judge is constrained by the law. She cannot just do whatever she likes. And yet
there are, strictly speaking, two components to any judicial decision.2 First,
the judge must ascertain the content of the relevant law. And, second, she must
apply it to the case at hand and give a decision. The first step can be difficult
if the law is vague or ambiguous. However, even where the law is clear, the
second stage still exists. The judge must take the law and use it to render
judgment between the parties. This is the moment of decision, when the
parties’ fate rests squarely on the judge’s shoulders.
The moment of decision plays a central role in Sartre’s philosophy. Indeed,
he presents it as the defining feature of human experience. In Being and
Nothingness, Sartre draws a distinction between two basic modes of existence:
being-in-itself [l’être-en-soi] and being-for-itself [l’être-pour-soi].3 The
being-in-itself is a non-conscious object, which can be encapsulated by a
predetermined essence or function. Inanimate objects, such as books and wine
glasses, fall into this category.
The being-for-itself, by contrast, is a conscious agent or person able to
perceive and reflect upon the world around her. Sartre suggests that, far from
possessing a pre-determined essence, the being-for-itself is permanently
haunted by the possibility of ‘nothingness’ or negation.4 In other words, the
being-for-itself is forced to confront the possibility that things might be
otherwise than they are.
Freedom and responsibility
In our everyday lives, Sartre contends, we are constantly engaged in enquiries
about the world around us: questions ranging from whether there is a God to
where we put the car keys all place aspects of our existence into question.5
However, since any question we might pose raises the possibility of a negative
response, it becomes apparent that our place in the world is not necessary, but
contingent. This is the interplay between being and nothingness that gives his
book its title.
According to Sartre, contingency pervades the human experience of choice.
However sure we may be that a particular decision was correct, we are
nonetheless aware that other courses of action were possible. Since every
course we follow is pregnant with alternative paths we might have taken, it
seems that we cannot avoid ultimate responsibility for our decisions. Sartre
argues that this sense of inescapable responsibility tends to give rise to
anguish.6
Imagine that you are walking along a narrow trail on the edge of a
mountain. You are constantly aware of the importance of treading carefully, so
2 For similar themes, see M J Detmold, ‘Law as Practical Reason’ (1989) 48 Cambridge Law
Journal 436; Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ in
Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds), Deconstruction and the
Possibility of Justice (Routledge, 1992) 3.
3 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (Hazel
E Barnes trans, Methuen, 1958) lxiii [trans of L’Etre et le Néant (first published 1943)].
4 Ibid 11, 16.
5 Ibid 6–12.
6 Ibid 17, 29–45.
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as not to lose your footing. At the same time, however, you are also aware that
you could just as easily throw yourself over the precipice.7 Sartre points out
that human existence is full of such potentially life-altering moments. The
everyday actions of driving a car or having a conversation could be altered
irrevocably by one decision: in the space of a moment, you could easily steer
your car into incoming traffic or make a callous comment that would alienate
a loved one forever.
For Sartre, then, human life involves an unavoidable double realisation. In
the first place, the alternative possibilities present in my experience of choice
reveal to me that I am free. At the same time, however, I am also aware that
I am responsible, since I am confronted with the apparent absence of
constraints on potentially significant exercises of my freedom. Whether I walk
calmly along the ledge or throw myself head along into the abyss, the decision
rests with me alone.
The anguish of the judge
Let us return, then, to the role of the judge. We have seen that the process of
giving judgment between the parties leads inevitably to the moment of
decision. In this moment, the judge is both free and responsible: nobody can
tell her what decision to make and responsibility rests with her alone. Of
course, as we have already seen, the judge’s decision is constrained by the law,
but she nonetheless remains responsible for determining the case in a
particular way.
Sartre argues that this kind of free and responsible decision-making
naturally produces anguish. It is in this sense, then, that the judge’s role is a
difficult and weighty one. Many is the judge who has lain awake at night after
deciding a case, wondering if she made the right decision. And many is the
judge who has agonised after the fact, despite having faithfully applied the
law. This is because it is not the law that makes the decision, but the judge.
The ultimate duty of the judge — to render a decision between the parties —
is one from which nobody can absolve her.
Sartre argues that, in order to lead an authentic existence, humans must
embrace the freedom and responsibility that lies at the heart of their lives.
They must acknowledge that the type of person they become, far from being
dictated by external forces, is a function of the life they decide to lead. For the
being-for-itself, as Sartre puts it in Existentialism and Humanism, ‘existence
precedes essence’.8 Our character is not necessary or fixed, but contingent
upon our choices.
A person, unlike an object such as a chair or a cheese platter, is not brought
into existence with a preordained set of defining features. We are not born
honest, cowardly, loyal or untrustworthy. These types of character traits are,
and can only be, a function of the way a person chooses to live. An authentic
life involves taking responsibility for our character and recognising our ability
to change who we have become. It is only when we die that this project of
self-creation is over.
7 Ibid 30–1.
8 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism (Philip Mairet trans, Methuen, 1948) 26
[trans of L’Existentialisme est un humanisme (first published 1946)].
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The task of living an authentic life is a challenging one. It is tempting to
shirk responsibility for our choices, attributing them instead to hardwired
aspects of our character or overwhelming external forces. However, Sartre
depicts such attitudes as forms of bad faith [mauvaise foi].9 Our existential
freedom confronts us in every aspect of our existence. Any attempt to deny
our capacity to shape our lives through our choices is therefore a form of
self-deception, ‘a lie to oneself’.10
The letter of the law
The weight of existential responsibility that lies on the judge’s shoulders helps
explain why different judges approach their role in diverse ways. Some
judges, for example, embrace the security provided by the letter of the law.
Judicial philosophies such as strict textualism emphasise the extent to which
the judge is restrained by the legal materials. These views of judging
downplay the freedom and responsibility of the judge by emphasising how the
law dictates her choices.
Chief Justice John Roberts of the United States Supreme Court famously
claimed at his confirmation hearings in 2005 that the role of the judge is to
‘call balls and strikes’ like a baseball umpire, applying the legal rules rather
than shaping them.11 This view brought a sharp response from the subsequent
Supreme Court nominee, Justice Elena Kagan, at her own confirmation
hearings a few years later. The problem with the metaphor, according to
Justice Kagan, is that it makes law seem like a ‘robotic enterprise’, where no
judgment or discretion is required.12
Roberts’s statement can be viewed as an example of the strict textualist
strategy mentioned above. This approach to judging has its virtues in terms of
reminding judges of the limitations of their role. However, it also brings to
mind Sartre’s criticisms of conceptions of morality that equate virtuous action
with sticking to a rigid moral code. The problem with this type of outlook is
that it encourages people to avoid taking personal responsibility for their
actions. People rely on the code to tell them what to do, instead of confronting
each situation on its merits.
In Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre illustrates this problem through the
story of a student who approached him for advice.13 The student was trying to
choose between joining the Free French Forces in England and staying in
France to care for his aging mother. He found each option morally attractive,
but for different reasons. Leaving for England would enable him to defend his
country and his ideals, but looking after his mother was important to him on
a more personal level.
After considering the student’s situation, Sartre responded with what must
have seemed very unhelpful advice: ‘You are free, so choose.’14 His point was
9 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, above n 3, 48.
10 Ibid.
11 Mark Tushnet, In the Balance: Law and Politics on the Roberts Court (W W Norton, 2013)
ix.
12 Ibid x.
13 Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, above n 8, 35–8.
14 Ibid 38 (translation modified).
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not that there can never be a right answer to a moral question, but rather that
the student could not resolve his dilemma by reference to some abstract
formula. Rather, he faced a competition between two dearly held ideals. The
only honest response was to make a choice and accept responsibility for the
outcome.
Sartre observes that when people ask for advice on a difficult moral
decision, they have often already made up their minds on what to do. He
suspects the student had already made his choice, but wanted to lessen his
personal guilt by getting his professor’s endorsement. If the student had
wanted to stay with his mother, Sartre remarks, he would have sought advice
from a conservative priest.15
A similar point applies to the strict textualist judge. The fact that this judge
strictly applies the letter of the law does not mean she is not responsible for
the outcome. For one thing, the laws are often vague: they need someone to
interpret and apply them. The strict textualist exercises as much creativity as
any other judge in such cases, but may be tempted to disguise it by citing the
legal text.
More fundamentally, however, even clear legal rules do not ultimately
absolve the judge from making a decision in the case at hand. Strict textualism
and similar philosophies make it look like the judge has no control over the
final outcome. Sartre, however, would see this refusal to accept responsibility
for one’s decisions as a form of bad faith. Legal rules may set out guidelines
for our actions, but they do not and cannot determine what choices we
ultimately make. Only we, as free and responsible agents, can do that. This
point applies to judges as much as anyone else.
Postponing responsibility
The strict textualist at least has the merit of being clear and decisive. There is
another kind of judge prone to evoke despair in law students and practitioners
alike. This is the judge who cloaks every decision in reams of prolix
reasoning, so that anyone who reads to the end is left unclear exactly what has
been decided. This judge can also be seen as responding to the pressures of her
role. She dresses up her decision in elaborate legal language, thereby
deflecting attention and criticism.
The prolix judge effectively defers the moment of decision by stringing out
her reasoning for as long as possible. Sartre discusses a similar example in
Being and Nothingness.16 The example (which is undoubtedly a bit sexist)
concerns a woman on a first date. The woman’s date flirts with her all evening,
making comments like, ‘I find you so attractive!’ However, the woman
chooses to take these remarks as compliments to her personality, rather than
her physical attributes.
Finally, the woman’s date places his hand on hers. Surely, this is the
moment of decision, where she must decide whether to return his advances.
However, the woman does not want to respond, as she would have to either
hurt her date’s feelings or admit to returning his attraction. So she simply
15 Ibid 37–8.
16 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, above n 3, 55–6.
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leaves her hand there — like a ‘thing’, as Sartre puts it17 — while pretending
not to notice. Like the prolix judge, the woman has a decision to make, but she
is not ready to confront it. Her reaction is therefore to ignore the situation and
hope it will resolve itself.
The prolix judge, then, uses effusive reasoning as a way of diffusing the
demands of her role. She hopes that if she considers the legal issues from
every possible angle, then the outcome will seem inevitable. However, as with
the strict textualist, this strategy only serves to obscure the judge’s underlying
agency.
Playing the judicial role
Other judges adopt a similar strategy to the prolix judge by relying on pomp
and ceremony. They obscure the moment of decision, not through legal
reasoning, but through the legal process. This kind of judge is a traditionalist
about procedure and decorum. Every aspect of the courtroom process is
observed to the letter, so that the decision seems to flow naturally from what
went before.
Sartre would say the traditionalist is playing the role of a judge, rather than
simply being one. In Being and Nothingness, he gives a famous example of a
waiter in a café who tries a little too hard to inhabit his role. As Sartre puts it,
‘his movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid’.18
He approaches the patrons a little too quickly, bends forward too eagerly and
shows a little too much interest in their orders. Finally, he returns to the
kitchen, walking with an artificially stiff and formal gait, ‘while carrying his
tray with the recklessness of a tightrope walker’.19
The waiter in Sartre’s example aspires to carry out his role in such a way
that every part of it seems necessary and inevitable. He wishes to be a waiter,
in the same way as a table is a table or a wine glass is a wine glass. Similarly,
the judicial traditionalist wishes to fully inhabit the judicial role. However, the
upshot of this is to make it appear that it is the judicial role, not the judge, who
renders the decisions. This represents another way of lightening the judge’s
existential burden.
It is, of course, not just judges who adopt these kinds of strategies. Lawyers,
managers and police officers all often cite the demands of their role as a way
of justifying actions that may not sit well with their personal values. A
significant portion of the literature on lawyers’ ethics, for example, focuses on
why lawyers can legitimately defend their clients’ interests when they
personally find them repugnant.
The standard answer to this question emphasises the special nature of the
lawyer’s role.20 The legal process plays an important role in society and
lawyers, in turn, play an essential role within that system. This account,




20 See, eg, Tim Dare, The Counsel of Rogues? A Defence of the Standard Conception of the
Lawyer’s Role (Ashgate, 2009); W Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton
University Press, 2010).
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professional actions: as if they become different people when they step into
the courtroom.
The champion of sincerity
The traditionalist seeks relief from the burden of judging by embracing the
formality of her role. Other judges seem to actively critique or distance
themselves from their position. These are the judges who can be found at
dinner parties telling cynical stories illustrating the flaws of the legal process.
If an earnest friend asks them, ‘What about justice?’, then they may be met
with a wry shrug — or perhaps a jaded remark about how the law is not the
place to find it.
This judge, like the others discussed above, is trying to cope with the
contingency of her role. A similar attitude can be seen in another of Sartre’s
examples from Being and Nothingness.21 Suppose a person who has behaved
poorly says, ‘Sorry, I can’t help it; I’m just a bad person.’ Is this confession
to be applauded? Sartre does not think so. This self-styled ‘champion of
sincerity’ appears to be owning up to his shortcomings, but really he is seeking
to avoid responsibility.
His comment that he is ‘a bad person’ treats his character as fixed, as though
he were born bad and there is nothing he can do about it. At the same time,
he seeks to gain merit in the eyes of others by being sincere about his flaws.
He effectively turns his depravity into a badge of honour.
Sartre would, I think, take a similar view of the judicial cynic. This judge
takes the attitude that she is part of a corrupt system and there is nothing she
can do about it. This jaded attitude may almost come to be worn as a badge
of honour. Sartre, however, would remind the cynic that, in the end, she is the
one who makes the decisions that she later criticises. It may be difficult to
change a flawed legal system, but the judge is in a better position than most
to do something about it.
Confronting contingency
Sartre’s analysis of bad faith reveals a number of existential traps relevant to
the judicial role. What, then, is the ideal style of judging, which avoids the
various pitfalls that Sartre describes? I want to conclude this article by
sketching out a model of the authentic judge, who accepts responsibility for
her decisions, without disclaiming her authority or denying the contingent
nature of her position.
The authentic judge does not simply cite the letter of the law to avoid debate
about her role. She does not treat her decision as flowing naturally or
inevitably from either her legal reasoning or the courtroom process. Nor does
she treat her decisions as determined by factors beyond the courtroom, such
as the vicissitudes of a flawed system over which she has no control.
Rather, the authentic judge is confident enough to recognise, first, that the
law is often open to interpretation and, second, that the administration of
justice is ultimately in her hands. Ultimately, it is her responsibility to decide
21 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, above n 3, 65–6.
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the case — and she does not shrink from this burden. She does so in full
awareness of her fallibility as a decision-maker.22 Her decisions may not
always turn out to be correct, but they represent her considered attempt to do
justice in the case at hand.
Maybe we can learn something about the authentic judge from an ostensibly
unlikely source: what Sartre says about romantic love. Sartre — admittedly
not known as a great romantic — notes that lovers often portray their love as
necessary, rather than contingent: they talk about being soulmates, ‘meant for
each other,’ ‘brought together by fate’ and so on.23 The reality, as Sartre sees
it, is more ambiguous and, in the end, more meaningful: each of us has many
potential partners, and if we stay with one person, it is because we choose
them over the rest.
Sartre describes love that embraces, rather than seeking to overcome, its
contingent nature as ‘love in the world’.24 Confronting the idea of love in the
world requires us to take responsibility for our relationships, rather than
presenting them as preordained or fated. Similarly, the authentic judge
practices ‘judging in the world’, neither shirking accountability, nor
pretending to be something she is not.
The authentic judge is decisive, but she does not pretend that her decision
is preordained and no other perspectives are possible. Rather, she calls it as
she sees it, doing her best to make the correct decision and taking the time to
explain her reasons clearly and transparently to those affected. She knows she
will not always get it right, and others may take a different view. Nonetheless,
she accepts responsibility for the outcome, saying: this is what I have chosen.
22 Compare Jonathan Crowe, ‘Human, All Too Human: Human Fallibility and the Separation
of Powers’ in Rebecca Ananian-Welsh and Jonathan Crowe (eds), Judicial Independence in
Australia: Contemporary Challenges, Future Directions (Federation Press, 2016) 37.
23 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, above n 3, 370.
24 Ibid.
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